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Abstract 
Using brand level retail data, the firm size distribution in 
Carbonated Soft Drinks is shown to be an outcome of the degree to 
which firms have placed brands effectively (store coverage) across 
vertical (flavour, packaging, diet attributes) segments of the 
market. Regularity in the firm size distribution is not disturbed by 
the nature of short-run brand competition (turbulence in brand 
market shares) within segments. Remarkably, product 
differentiation resulting from firms acquiring various portfolios of 
product attributes and stores in market evolution determines the 
limiting firm size distribution.  
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 Introduction 
 
Economists have long been consumed by the desire to identify and 
understand the mechanisms driving firm size distributions. The 
literature before Sutton (1998) left us with a legacy that failed to 
generalise on a form of firm size distribution.i Sutton (1998) provides 
us with a new empirical approach.ii Rather than looking for an exact 
size distribution, he derives a lower bound to firm size distribution 
that will hold in any industry where firms operate over segments 
that have emerged in the history of the marketiii. The lower bound is 
a limiting outcome driven by a sequence of deterministic entry 
games across the segments of the market. Theoretically, differences 
in firm coverage of segments override the details of events within 
segments in determining the limiting size distribution.  
 
To date the empirical validation of this theory defines segments in 
terms of geographic location in the US Cement Industry (Sutton, 
1998), the Spanish Retail Banking Sector (De Juan, 1999) and the 
Italian Motor Insurance Industry (Buzzacchi and Valletti, 1999).  
These industries host a homogenous product line. The lower bound 
to firm size distribution at the national level is not violated in any of 
these studies. In the case of the US Cement Industry, we observe 
firms of similar size within each State. The inequality at the national 
level is mainly determined by the varying presence of firms across 
geographical locationsiv. To be a large firm at the national level 
requires a presence over many States. This point was also shown for 
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Retail Banking and Motor Insurance. As predicted by Sutton’s (1998) 
theory, the degree of coverage (portfolios) of geographical locations 
by firms can by itself explain most of the observed differences in 
firm size at the national level. 
 
Using the Sutton (1998) framework we model the firm size 
distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks in the Irish retail market 
using AC Nielsen data on the population of 178 brands belonging to 
13 firms operating over 40 product characteristics and 27 bi-monthly 
periods, 1992-1997.  The retail market for Carbonated Soft Drinks in 
Ireland is broadly similar to the U.S. There are differences between 
Ireland and the US that are typical of European Carbonated Soft 
Drinks markets [see Sutton (1991)]. These differences are 
highlighted in our data section. Companies in the business of 
Carbonated Soft Drinks produce products defined by various 
flavour, packaging and diet attributes. To allow for flavour 
segments (Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit) is standard in 
the analysis of Carbonated Soft Drinks [see Sutton (1991) and Dubé 
(2000)].  Moreover, Dubé (2000), using household data to estimate 
the short-run impact of soft drink mergers, highlights the need to 
define product attributes further by nutritional content and 
packaging size.  
 
Sutton (1998) predicts that market segmentation and heterogeneous 
operations over such segments by firms imposes a limiting lower 
bound to firm size distribution, or a minimum degree of inequality 
that will generate a Gini co-efficient of at least 0.5. We are the first to 
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provide an empirical validation of the Sutton (1998) bounds 
approach using counts (portfolios) of vertical segments as a key 
determinant of firm size, where forty market segments are defined 
by different combinations of flavour, packaging and diet attributesv. 
Measuring firm size based solely on portfolios of product attributes, 
for example a firm has a size of ten if it has at least one brand in ten 
segments, generates a firm size distribution above the 
mathematically predicted lower bound. The Lorenz-curve analysis 
for every bi-monthly period is supplemented with an econometric 
model of firm size. The results show us that company coverage of 
market segments, amongst other factors, has great explanatory 
power and induces significant regularity in the firm size distribution 
over the period 1992-1997. 
 
A count on product attributes assumes that all firm sales are the 
same within and across the segments of the market. Differences in 
the intensity of short-run price competition within segments will not 
lead to violations of the lower bound, but is shown theoretically to 
push the size distribution further inside the bound. Our data allows 
us to test this proposition. We extend the Lorenz-curve analysis and 
the econometric model of firm size by weighting a presence in a 
vertical (product) attribute by horizontal (store) coverage within a 
segment. For example, if shop coverage by a firm within a segment 
is only fifty per cent of the store population, rather than attributing 
one to firm size due to having a presence in a defined segment we 
attribute 0.5. Once can also weight store coverage in terms of the size 
of the store in Carbonated Soft Drinks turnover. This gives us an 
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analysis of effective firm coverage of market segments. In other 
words, we allow for different portfolios of stores (generating 
varying degrees of horizontal product differentiation) within 
segments. Firm size measured on the basis of effective coverage of 
product segments not only pushes the size distribution further 
inside Sutton’s (1998) mathematically predicted lower bound, but 
also explains most of the actual firm size distribution. In the history 
of the market firms accumulate various portfolios of product 
attributes and stores, as an outcome of many strategic entry games. 
Remarkably, the structure of how firms operate over such vertical 
and horizontal dimensions of the Carbonated Soft Drinks market 
determines the limiting firm size distribution.  
 
Finally, to understand how brand market share turbulence within 
segments will not lead to violations of the lower bound or indeed 
disturb the regularity in the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft 
Drinks we test a final assertion of Sutton’s theoretical framework. 
Theory shows that competition can generate within segment size 
distributions of various forms. If segmentation exists and firms have 
heterogeneous operations over these segments, then any changes in 
firm sales within segments will only have second order effects on 
the aggregate inequality and will not lead to violations of the lower 
bound. We show that short-run brand market share rivalry is 
localised within our product segments, and within segment 
competition is augmented by the nature of store coverage by brands. 
The nature of product differentiation on two dimensions is shown to 
dictate and constrain the nature of competition between brands. Size 
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distributions of firm sales within product segments take on many 
forms and vary over-time. Yet, the details of within segment sales 
activity do not override the effect that heterogeneous coverage of 
segments by firms has on the firm size distribution at the level of 
Carbonated Soft Drinks.  
 
Remarkably, product differentiation resulting from firms 
acquiring various portfolios of stores and product attributes in 
market evolution determines the limiting firm size distribution. So 
while the Coca-Cola Company has on average 52 per cent of the 
Carbonated Soft Drinks retail market in Ireland over the period 
1992 to 1997, its dominance does not result from its performance in 
the Cola market. Rather, its success lies in the establishment of a 
portfolio of brands across 91 per cent of the vertical segments with 
an effective (weighted by store coverage within segments) 
coverage of 58 per cent.  Smaller firms operate alongside the 
multinationals by specialising into various vertical and horizontal 
segments of the market. The nature of product differentiation is 
shown to have important implications for anti-trust work.  
 
I. Data Description 
 
AC Nielsen, an international marketing research company, has 
collated a panel database of all brands in Carbonated Soft Drinks 
distributed throughout Irish retail stores for use in our empirical 
analysis. The evolution of the Irish retail grocery market structure 
from the early 1970s is described in Walsh and Whelan (1999a). 
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Unlike the UK retail market for Carbonated Drinks “own brands” 
are not a feature of the Irish Market. The retail market for 
Carbonated Soft Drinks in Ireland is broadly similar to the U.S. We 
have a similar style of chain stores and corner shops and a heavily 
branded market. In 1997, the top two firms collectively account for 
73 per cent of the Irish market and 75 per cent of the US retail 
market. Inequality in retail sales as measured by the Gini co-efficient 
is 0.72 in Ireland and 0.68 in the US. There are differences between 
Ireland and the US that are typical of European Carbonated Soft 
Drinks markets. These differences are highlighted in case studies of 
several countries in Sutton (1991). The Cola segment of the market is 
35 to 40 per cent in Europe, compared to 63 per cent in the US. While 
Pepsi has a smaller share of the Cola segment in Europe, it is 
merged with 7-UP outside the US. The nature of bottling is not fully 
integrated in Europe allowing smaller firms to co-exist with the 
multinationals. Finally, while flavour segments are similar to the US 
in Ireland, Root Beer and Dr. Pepper type brands never took off.    
 
The database provides bi-monthly population data spanning 
October 1992 to March 1997 for 178 brands, identified for 13 firms 
and 40 product characteristics within the particular “business” of 
Carbonated Soft Drinksvi. The data record the retail activities of both 
Irish and foreign owned brands/firms selling throughout the stores 
of the Irish retail sectorvii. We are bound by a contract of 
confidentiality with AC Nielsen not to reveal information not 
otherwise available on the market. We have extensive bi-monthly 
brand level information regarding information on brand price 
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(average of individual brand prices across all stores selling the 
brand weighted by brand sales share within the store), quantity (in 
ml), sales value (in £000), distribution structure (number and size of 
the stores through which the brand retails), firm attachment and 
their vertical (flavour, packaging, and diet) characteristics. An 
interesting feature of the AC Nielsen data is their identification of 
various segments within the market for Carbonated Soft Drinks, 
which group clusters of brands by 40 characteristics: 4 flavours 
(Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit), 5 different packaging 
types (Cans, Standard Bottle, 1.5 Litre, 2 Litre and Multi-Pack of 
Cans) and 2 different sweeteners, diet and regular. Packaging 
format is recognised as a crucial feature of this market. Over 90 per 
cent of cans and standard bottles are impulse buys distributed 
through small corner stores and garage forecourts rather than chain 
stores. In contrast, the majority of 2 litre and multi-pack cans are 
distributed through one-stop supermarket shopping. The industry 
has clearly introduced different packaging to satisfy different 
consumer needs within both the impulse and one-stop shopping 
segments (Walsh and Whelan, 1999a).  
 
We define the firm business as Carbonated Soft Drinks, but within 
this market firms place brands, or take-up roles, across various 
segments of the market. So if a firm operates in all segments, it has 
adopted 40 different roles. Details of the segments and associated 
number of firm roles and brands they host are set out in Table 1. 
Interestingly there are only 100 roles taken up, on average, by the 13 
firms. If every firm operated in every segment we would have 13 
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firms in each of the 40 segments giving a total of 520 roles. There is a 
very heterogeneous and a persistent pattern in the take up of roles 
by firms across vertical segments. This will be shown to be a key 
structural feature of the industry, particularly when weighted by the 
coverage of stores within segments, in the determination of the 
limiting firm size distribution. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 
A market is made up of segments that host at least one investment 
opportunity. The key structural feature of Sutton’s (1998) theory is 
the arrival of a number of discrete investment opportunities over an 
infinite period in the history of the market. Assuming opportunities 
of equal size arrive and are taken up by a firm, the market begins 
with a single firm of size 1. Each subsequent opportunity is taken up 
by either a new firm or existing firm. If opportunities were taken up 
in succession by new firms, the resultant limiting size distribution 
will display perfect equality between firms of size 1. Differences in 
firm sizes emerge when firms have taken up a different number of 
opportunities across the segments of the market. Sutton (1998) puts 
weak restrictions on the form of the entry game into segments that 
host investment opportunities to model a lower bound on the size 
distribution of firms in a market. A symmetric equilibrium in mixed 
strategies can be calculated where each firm has an equal probability 
of entering a segment to take up an opportunity and therefore have 
‘equal treatment’. By imposing a symmetry requirement on the 
strategy space of each subgame, all equilibria are excluded except 
8 
this mixed strategy equilibrium. Sutton (1998) derives his lower 
bound within a game-theoretic model using this Symmetry Principle 
when modelling deterministic entry processes across the segments 
of the market.viii  
 
Firm size in this case is simply equal to the total number of segments 
over which they operate. Firm size distribution, based on a simple 
count of segments, is restricted to a lower bound Lorenz curve. The 
limiting Lorenz curve graphs the fraction of top k ranking firms in 
the population N of firms, k/N, against their corresponding market 
share, given by the k-firm concentration ratio, Ck, that satisfies, 
 
( )NkNkk ln1C −≥                 (1) 
 
Segmentation and heterogeneous participation of firms across 
segments dictates a lower bound to firm size distribution in a 
market that is associated with a Gini co-efficient of 0.5. This is the 
first prediction that we will test in the next section. One can augment 
the framework to allow firm size advantages (scope economies) in 
the take up of opportunities, or violations of the Symmetry Principle. 
This induces more heterogeneity in firm size during market 
evolution and a resultant size distribution that is inside the limiting 
lower bound.  
 
The size of a firm within segments can differ due to differences 
across segments in the nature of short run price competition. The 
affect of introducing this additional dimension in measuring firm 
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size is to introduce additional heterogeneity between firms in the 
market and so greater skewness. Thus, firm size distribution that 
allows for roles of different sizes will result in a Lorenz curve that 
lies above that based on a pure count of roles across segments. This 
is the basic proposition in the theorem of majorisation (Marshall and 
Olkin, 1979).  We will test this second prediction by allowing firm size 
within segments to depend on store coverage. Heterogeneity in 
shop coverage by firms within segments is predicted to push the 
size distribution further inside the boundix.  
  
Finally, the size of roles, or firm size within segments, depends on 
the intensity of competition between brands of firms.  Hence, in the 
absence of very special conditions, not applicable to Carbonated Soft 
Drinks, there are no theoretical restrictions on the shape of role size 
distribution within segments.x The distribution of firms within 
segments can therefore be either very skewed or very equal. We test 
a third prediction, that irrespective of the nature of size distributions 
within segments, the heterogeneous coverage of segments by firms 
is predicted to generate a firm size distribution that will not violate 
the lower Bound.  
 
III Lorenz Curve Analysis Carbonated Soft Drinks 
 
The actual firm size distribution observed in the Carbonated Soft 
Drinks market is illustrated in Figure 1, averaged over the five-year 
period and for each bi-monthly period. This measures firm size as 
total firm sales in the business of Carbonated Soft Drinks, and plots 
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the fraction of top k ranking firms in Carbonated Soft Drinks, k/N, 
against their corresponding market share in Carbonated Soft Drinks. 
N is the total number of firms and Ck describes the k-firm sales 
concentration ratio in the market. For example, the top 25 per cent of 
firms collectively account for, on average, over 80 per cent of the 
market. We do not observe a violation of the predicted lower bound 
in our scatter of points in any bi-monthly period. The corresponding 
Gini co-efficient measure of inequality is 0.72, which clearly exceeds 
the mathematically predicted lower bound or a Gini co-efficient of 
0.5.  
 
We first test the prediction that segmentation and heterogeneous 
participation of firms across segments dictates a lower bound to firm 
size distribution in a market. We analyse whether the presence of 
firms operating over vertical segments in Carbonated Soft Drinks 
places this lower bound on the shape of the firm size distribution. 
Each firm is given one mark for each segment it is active in. The size 
of the firm in the Carbonated Soft Drinks market is simply equal to 
the number of segments across which a firm operates. The 
percentage of segments (flavour, packaging, diet attributes) covered 
by firms ranges from 2 to 91 per cent, with a tendency for higher 
ranked firms to cover relatively more segments.  Figure 2 illustrates 
the size distribution of firms on the basis of a count of segments 
(flavour, packaging, diet attributes), within Carbonated Soft Drinks 
on average over the five-year period, and for each bi-monthly 
period. The fit of the data to the theoretically predicted lower bound 
Lorenz Curve is remarkably tight for each and every period. Firm 
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size inequality that is only driven by the heterogeneous operations 
of firms across vertical segments corresponds to a Gini co-efficient of 
0.56, and lies above the mathematically derived lower bound 
predicted in Sutton (1998).  
 
Secondly we test the prediction that when one allows for roles of 
different sizes, this will result in a Lorenz curve that lies above that 
based on a pure count of roles. A presence in each vertical segment 
is weighted by the percentage of stores retailing the firm’s brands 
within the segment.  The size of the firm is no longer a simple count 
of segments that a firm has a brand in, but rather a count over 
fractions of these segments.  Figure 3 augments the Lorenz curve 
analysis to allow for the fact that having a partial coverage of shops 
within a segment can reduce the effective presence of a firm in a 
vertical segment. Thus, the effective operation of firms over vertical 
segments induces further heterogeneity in firm size and a Lorenz 
curve that is bowed further out from one based on a simple count of 
roles over vertical segments alone. This is evident in the Lorenz 
curve of Figure 3, which corresponds to a Gini co-efficient of 0.69, on 
average.  
 
The above Lorenz curve analysis is based on measures of effective 
coverage that uses a pure count of stores. One can weight store 
coverage in terms of the size of the store in Carbonated Soft Drinks 
turnover. The count of stores covered weighted by the share of 
each store in Carbonated Drink sales reflects the fact that a firm 
may target distribution in bigger or smaller stores. Effective 
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coverage of market segments ranges from 1 to 58 per cent. Figure 4 
is the Lorenz curve outcome when each role is weighted by the 
degree to which firms effectively cover retail stores in the 
Carbonated Drinks Market, that is, the percentage of Carbonated 
Drink sales accounted for by the stores in which a firm is located 
or retails. Inequality in firm size that is driven by the 
heterogeneous effective operation of firms over vertical segments 
when coverage of stores reflect store size within segments 
corresponds to a Gini co-efficient of 0.70, on average. Changing the 
weighting to reflect effective coverage within segments leads to 
slightly more inequality. In both cases allowing for roles of 
different sizes results in a Lorenz curve that lies above that based 
on a pure count of roles.   
 
Inequality between firms based only on a count of roles over 
segments weighted by effective coverage of stores within segments 
provides evidence for Sutton’s (1998) theory. Allowing for firms to 
have different portfolios of stores within segments not only pushes 
the inequality in firm size distribution further inside the bound but 
the actual size distribution in Figure 1, with a corresponding Gini 
co-efficient of 0.72, is just slightly above the size distribution based 
on a weighted (by effective store coverage within segments) count 
of roles across 40 vertical segments observed in Figure 4. 
Remarkably, product differentiation resulting from firms 
acquiring various portfolios of product attributes and stores in 
market evolution seems to determine most of the actual firm size 
distribution.  We supplement this Lorenz curve analysis with an 
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econometric model of firm size and an econometric model of 
market share rivalry within segments over the next two sections of 
the paper. 
 
IV An Econometric Model of Firm Size  
 
We wish to evaluate the statistical significance of firm coverage of 
product segments and stores within these segments as a 
determinant of firm size in the business of Carbonated Soft Drinks. 
We construct our dependent and independent variables from 
information on 178 brands produced by 13 firms over 27 bi-monthly 
periods.  The dependent variable corresponds to the observed size 
level for firm f at a given point in time, t. We sum over the unit sales 
of the brands belonging to the firm to get firm size measured in unit 
sales of Carbonated Soft Drinks. Firm size depends on a number 
observable and unobservable factors. The basic model may be 
written as follows, 
  
      ln ftfuftCYCLEln2ftCOVERAGEln1ftSIZE 0
ε++β+β+α=      (2)  
The variable COVERAGE controls for the percentage of vertical 
segments that the firm has at least one brand in. We base our 
regressions on coverage over 40 segments. Persistent participation 
rates and a potential endogeneity problem induce us to use coverage 
in the initial period of the data. In addition, we use two measures of 
effective coverage where the presence in a vertical segment is 
weighted by either the percentage of stores retailing the firm’s 
brands within the segment, or the percentage of stores (weighted by 
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size) retailing the firm’s brands within the segment in the initial 
periods. We also control for changes in the business cycle or 
seasonal effects with the variable CYCLE. This represents total 
product unit sales in the current period (excluding the firm’s sales), 
with higher values indicating boom periods. As an alternative, we 
also use a more refined measure of the business cycle with unit sales 
only of the vertical segments that a firm is in (excluding the firm’s 
sales), since the cyclicality of consumer demand can be very 
different for different vertical attributes. 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity between firms is controlled for by the 
inclusion of a unit specific residual, uf, which comprises of a 
collection of factors not in the regression that are firm specific and 
constant over time. For example, we have no data on advertising 
expenditures or costs of production. Failure to acknowledge 
unobserved heterogeneity among cross-sectional units would 
inevitably result in biased estimates of the model. The factors that 
affect the value of the dependent variable but have not been 
explicitly included as independent variables are appropriately 
summarised by a random effect across cross-sectional units that is 
assumed to be independent of the other regressors. The use of a 
random effect model was justified on the basis of a Hausman (1978) 
test of independence of uf with the other regressors. We also use a 
Hausman specification test to see whether our model of firm size 
based on the presence of 40 segments generates more efficiency and 
explanatory power than that created by repeating the same analysis 
either by 4 flavours or by 20 flavour by packaging segments.   
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 In Table 2 (a), (b) and (c) we present our econometric results. In 
Table 2 (a) we measure coverage as the percentage of the 40 vertical 
segments that the firm has at least one brand in, in the initial period 
of the data.  As the sole explanatory variable in Column I it explains 
52 per cent of our observations on firm size using a simple OLS 
estimator. We build up the model with a measure of the business 
cycle based on unit sales of all Carbonated Soft Drinks and firm 
random effects, accepted on the basis of the Hausman Specification 
test. GLS estimates are presented in column III.  The presence of an 
auto-correlated error structure of order one in the GLS models led 
us to adopt a transformation of the data to obtain the unbiased 
estimates of the coefficients presented for the AR(1) in column IV. 
The cross-section variation in firm size is explained reasonably well 
by firm coverage of vertical segments, although the time series 
variation is not well explained using the business cycle of the 
market.  In the last three columns we repeat the exercise using a 
measure of the business cycle for firms with unit sales only of the 
vertical segments that a firm is in.  The overall, in addition to within 
and between, explanatory power improves to 0.66 per cent. Finally 
based on the regression in column VI we report Hausman 
specification tests to see whether we get efficiency gains from 
having 40 segments when compared to having 4 flavour or 20 
flavour by packaging segments. The reported Hausman test, in both 
cases, accepts the null hypothesis that the difference in co-efficients 
between the two specifications is systematic. We have a better model 
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of firm size allowing for heterogeneous operations over 40 segments 
rather than just 4 or 20 segments. 
 
In Table 2 (b) we undertake exactly the same exercise as Table 2 (a), 
except we refine our measure of coverage of vertical segments in the 
initial period of the data to an effective measure that weights firm 
presence in a segment by the percentage of stores retailing the firm’s 
brands within the segment.  As the sole explanatory variable in 
column I it explains 73 per cent of our observations on firm size 
using a simple OLS estimator.  In the last three columns using a 
measure of the business cycle for firms with unit sales only of the 
vertical segments that a firm is in, the overall explanatory power is 
0.78.   
 
In Table 2 (c) we undertake exactly the same exercise, refining our 
measure of coverage further by weighting vertical coverage by the 
size weighted percentage of stores retailing the firm’s brands. As the 
sole explanatory variable in column I it explains 75 per cent of our 
observations on firm size. In the last three columns using a measure 
of the business cycle for firms with unit sales of the vertical 
segments that a firm is in, the overall explanatory power increases to 
0.81.   
 
In summary, a very simple model of firm size based on measures 
of effective coverage of vertical segments and segment business 
cycles as observable factors, controlling for unobservable firm 
effects, has remarkable explanatory power. As suggested by our 
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Lorenz curve analysis the size of a firm based on its portfolios of 
product attributes and stores in market evolution determines most 
of the actual firm size distributionxi.  In the next section we 
understand how brand market share turbulence within segments 
do not lead to violations of the lower bound or indeed disturb the 
regularity in the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks. 
This tests the final assertion of Sutton’s theoretical framework. 
  
V Within Segment Analysis of Carbonated Soft Drinks 
 
We wish to show that short-run brand market share rivalry is 
localised within our product segments, and within segment 
competition is augmented by the nature of store coverage by brands.  
In other words, that product differentiation on two dimensions 
determines the nature of competition between the 178 brands in 
Carbonated Soft Drinks. We validate the presence of segmentation 
by product characteristics applying Hausman, Leonard and Zona 
(1994) and Hausman (1996). They use the idea of multi-stage 
budgeting to construct a multi-level demand system for 
differentiated products to evaluate the short-run impact of new 
brandsxii. Our objective is to validate the presence of product 
segments and show that market share turbulence within these 
segments has second order effects on the overall size distribution. 
We wish to test whether we have weak separability of consumer 
preferences across the a priori segmentation of the market by our 
product attributes. As outlined in Hausman, Leonard and Zona 
(1994), weak separability of preferences is necessary and sufficient if 
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in the last stage of multi-stage budgeting brand expenditure within 
segments depends more on segment real income (rather than 
aggregate business cycles) and the price of the other brands within 
the segment (rather than from brands hosted in other segments), 
amongst other factors. To calculate overall price elasticities using 
multi-stage budgeting requires much more structure and stricter 
forms of independence.  
 
The precise form of the brand level expenditure function to be 
estimated in logs is written as the following,  
 
lnESist= α0 + α1ln Sst + α2lnCist +α3lnPist + α4ln∑CjstPjst + α5Mt + α6                  
Ff + α7 Ss + Ui + εit          (3) 
  
The dependent variable measures brand i expenditure share within 
one of the 40 segments s of Carbonated Soft Drinks over a bi-
monthly period. Sst is real segment income, measured by the total 
sales units of all brands in the segment.  Cist, is a store coverage 
variable for brand i, it measures the percentage of stores (weighted 
by store size) that a brand covers. Pist is the price of the brand, in 
Irish pounds, deflated using a paasche price index. The impact of 
other brand j prices in the segment is weighted by each brands 
horizontal distance from the market in terms of shop coverage, Cjst. 
The weighted average of other brands deflated prices in the 
Carbonates market is thus ∑CjstPjst.  A direct impact of store 
coverage, Cist , on brand market shares and its indirect effect through 
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cross-price effects will indicate to us that horizontal product 
differentiation matters for market share rivalry. This is an outcome 
of brands hosting varying shop portfolios. We control for macro 
factors with month dummies, Mt, Firm dummies, Ff,, and segment 
dummies, Ss, which controls for the possible influence of time, firm 
and segment effects. Unobserved heterogeneity between brands is 
controlled for by the inclusion of a unit specific residual, Ui, which 
comprises of a collection of factors not in the regression that are 
brand specific and constant over time. For example, we have no data 
on costs of production.  Finally, εit is the unexplained component in 
the brand level expenditure function.  
 
In order to explore whether segments in vertical attributes are 
present and brand competition is more localised in the relevant 
segments of the market we use the approach in Hausman, Leonard 
and Zona (1994) to test for the presence of weak separability of 
consumer preferences across our segments. Equation 3 can be 
estimated with less segmentation reflected in the construction of real 
expenditure and average prices of other brands, and segment 
dummies. One constructs real expenditure on all brands in 20 
flavour by packaging segments, 4 flavour segments, and in 
Carbonated Soft Drinks (zero segments). Likewise the weighted 
average of other brands prices could be averaged over less refined 
segmentation of the market. 
 
Using Hausman specification tests we test whether the inclusion of 
real expenditure and the cross-price index defined for more refined 
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40 segments as additional regressors leads to efficiency gains in the 
estimation procedure. As additional regressors firstly compared to 
when real expenditure and the cross-price index is defined at the 
product level assuming no segments, secondly when segment 
expenditure and segment cross-price effects reflect 4 flavour 
segments, and finally reflect 20 flavour by packaging segments. This 
is how we intend to proceed to endogenously define the relevant 
vertical segments for clusters of brands within Carbonated Soft 
Drinks.  
 
The IV Model 
 
In addition to the problem of identifying segments of the markets 
for differentiated products, there is the problem of multicollinearity 
of prices and the fact that segment real expenditure may be an 
outcome of multi-stage budgeting, leading to the need of a good 
instrument for each of them. The multicollinearity of prices is 
addressed by exploiting the panel structure of the underlying data. 
Allowing for firm and segment fixed effects, we instrument the price 
of a firms brand in a segment using the prices of a firm’ brands in 
other segments applying the econometric methodology of Hausman 
and Taylor (1981). The prices of a firms’ brands in other segments, 
after the elimination of segment and firm effects, are driven by 
common underlying costs correlated with brand price but are 
uncorrelated with the disturbances in the brand demand equations. 
Availability of panel data is crucial. We instrument real segment 
expenditure with aggregate (net of segment expenditure) real 
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expenditure following Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994). The 
need to instrument own-price and segment expenditure is tested 
using Hausman (1978) specification tests for instruments. 
 
Results 
 
The results of an OLS brand expenditure share regression within 40 
segments are provided in the first column of Table 3. Due to some 
brand entry over-time the number of observations is 3159. Across 
segments, brand expenditure shares are significantly negatively 
related to real segment expenditures, or the size of the segment. 
Greater coverage of stores (weighted by size) in the first month t0 
enhances brand shares over bi-monthly periods. We observe that the 
estimated deflated own-price and the average deflated cross price of 
brands within the segment (weighted by store coverage) have, on 
average, a very significant negative and positive impact, 
respectively. The diagnostics on the residuals confirms that we find 
first-order autoregressive residuals and heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals, reflecting omitted variables among other factors.   
Exploiting our panel on brands we allow for a brand random effect 
in residuals. The results of a GLS brand expenditure share 
regression within 40 segments, is provided in the second column of 
table 3. The results are largely similar in terms of observable 
explanatory variables but the effect of introducing unobservable 
brand specific effects reduces the first-order autoregressive process 
and heteroscedasticity in the residuals.  
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In column II we also report Hausman specification tests to see 
whether we get efficiency gains from the localised definitions of real 
expenditure and average prices, when compared to more aggregate 
measures of real expenditure and average prices of other brands 
across segments. The reported Hausman test, in all three cases, 
accepts the null hypothesis that the difference in co-efficients 
between the two specifications is systematic. To conclude, as in 
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), we seem to have weak 
separability of preferences across our 40 attributes since we gain 
efficiency in our model of brand expenditure shares when we use 
real expenditures and price of the other brands defined for more 
refined segmentation of the market.  The presence of an auto-
correlated error structure of order one in the GLS models led us to 
adopt a transformation of the data to obtain the unbiased estimates 
of the coefficients presented for the AR(1) in column III which are 
largely the same as in column II. 
 
The results of a GLS brand expenditure share regression within 40 
segments, instrumenting real segment expenditure with market 
expenditure (net of segment expenditure) and brand own price with 
the average price of brands belonging to the same firm in other 
segments, are provided in column IV and, allowing for the presence 
of an auto-correlated error structure of order one, in the IVGLS, 
column V of Table 3.  The results are largely similar, and the 
Hausman IV specification test accepts the null hypothesis that the 
difference in co-efficients between the two specifications is not 
systematic. It is possible that retail prices and segment expenditure 
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can be quite exogenous with respect to current sales movements, 
due to weather or seasonal effects and to the nature of retail pricing 
(see Hausman, Leonard and Zona, 1994).  
  
Overall the short-run strategic interactions between brands are 
localised within vertical segments where competition is relaxed 
further within segments by various degrees of horizontal product 
differentiation.  
 
Firm ‘Role’ Size Distributions Within Segments of Carbonated Soft 
Drinks 
 
Our simple approach to modelling firm size distribution illustrates a 
structural feature that induces great stability in firm size distribution 
over the period examined, despite a high level of brand sale 
turbulence at a more micro level. The size of roles, or firm size 
within segments, depends on the intensity of competition between 
brands within segments. There are no theoretical restrictions on the 
shape of role size distribution within segments. Hence, the 
distribution of firms within segments can be either very skewed or 
very equal. This outcome is illustrated in Figure 5 for the 40 
segments. This depicts the percentage of segment sales accounted 
for by the top k firms operating within that segment, ranked in 
ascending order of firm size within the segment. We observe a 
scatter of points that lie very close to the diagonal, and other more 
skewed distributions within segments. The scatter of points jumps 
around from one bi-monthly period to another. The Gini co-efficient 
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within each segment, averaged over the period, varies from almost 
perfect equality to 0.68. Competition between brands within 
segments, relaxed to various degrees by horizontal product 
differentiation, generate size distributions of firm sales within 
segments of various forms that change over-time. Compared to the 
overall firm size distribution, within vertical segments size 
distributions are more equal and in most cases violate the Sutton 
Bound. Yet, equality within segments does not induce aggregate 
equality at the level of Carbonated Drinks. Segmentation and 
heterogeneous participation of firms across vertical segments 
dictates a lower bound to firm size distribution in a market that is 
associated with a Gini co-efficient of 0.5.   
 
Short-run strategic interactions between brands are localised within 
vertical segments. Differences in store coverage, among other 
factors, results in firm sales (roles) within segments of different 
sizes. Further product differentiation within segments pushes the 
size distribution inside a bound based on a pure count of product 
attributes. Turbulence in brand market shares within these 
structural dimensions of the market can be great but does not 
disturb the regularity in the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft 
Drinks. Remarkably, product differentiation, and not short-run 
brand competition, resulting from firms acquiring various portfolios 
of stores and product attributes in market evolution determines the 
limiting firm size distribution. Coca-Cola Company is ranked one in 
the Carbonated Soft Drinks retail market in Ireland over the period 
1992-1997, but its dominance does not result from its performance 
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within vertical segments. Rather its success lies in the establishment 
of a portfolio of brands across most of the vertical segments, 
distributed effectively throughout retail stores. Small firms can co-
exist with the multinationals by specialising into product segments 
with targeted distribution.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The presence of flavour, packaging and diet segments within 
Carbonated Soft Drinks provides an ideal setting to empirically 
examine the role of portfolio effects as a very simple way to model 
firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks. Heterogeneity in 
firm coverage of product attributes imposes Sutton’s (1998) 
mathematically predicted lower bound on the firm size 
distribution.  Allowing for further firm heterogeneity in store 
coverage within segments induces a firm size distribution that is 
inside the bound and very close to the actual firm size distribution 
in Carbonated Soft Drinks. In the history of the market firms 
accumulate various portfolios of product attributes and stores, 
dimensions of the Carbonated Soft Drinks market that determine 
the limiting firm size distribution.  
 
Taking a bottom-up approach we show that short-run strategic 
interactions between brands are localised within vertical segments 
and competition is relaxed further within segments by various 
degrees of imperfect shop coverage. We show that while individual 
segments host many forms of firm sales distributions, as an outcome 
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of brand competition within segments, this does not lead to a 
violation Sutton’s lower bound or determine to a great extent the 
firm size distribution observed for Carbonated Soft Drinks.  
 
This has the short-run implication that mergers of firms with brands 
that cover different product segments would have a much greater 
impact on market share distributions than mergers between firms 
with brands in the same segments. Success in the Carbonated Soft 
Drinks is based on the establishment of an effective (good 
distribution across stores) portfolio of brands across most of the 
product attributes. Small firms co-exist by specialising into these 
dimensions. The issue for anti-trust is whether portfolios effects are 
an outcome of anti-competitive forces.  
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Table 1: Firm Roles and Brands in Segments of Carbonated Drinks Market, Oct.92-
May 97 
Segments Mean Size 
(£000) 
Mean % 
Share of 
Total 
Carbonated 
Drinks 
Total No. 
Firms over 
period 
Total No. 
Brands over 
period 
Cans     
Regular Cola 2040 8.7 4 7 
Diet Cola 519 2.3 3 5 
Regular Orange 848 3.7 4 6 
Diet Orange 100 0.5 1 3 
Regular Lemonade 665 3.0 2 4 
Diet Lemonade 256 1.1 1 2 
Regular Mixed Fruit 988 4.3 6 8 
Diet Mixed Fruit 17 0.1 1 2 
Standard     
Regular Cola 1633 6.3 6 11 
Diet Cola 417 1.6 2 3 
Regular Orange 911 3.5 5 13 
Diet Orange 19 0.1 1 1 
Regular Lemonade 556 2.2 3 7 
Diet Lemonade 96 0.3 1 1 
Regular Mixed Fruit 3137 11.6 7 21 
Diet Mixed Fruit 19 0.1 1 1 
1.5 Ltr.     
Regular Cola 640 2.8 3 3 
Diet Cola 212 0.9 2 4 
Regular Orange 510 2.2 4 6 
Diet Orange 51 0.2 1 1 
Regular Lemonade 892 4.0 2 4 
Diet Lemonade 394 1.8 1 2 
Regular Mixed Fruit 447 1.9 6 7 
Diet Mixed Fruit 1 0.02 1 1 
2 Ltr.     
Regular Cola 1883 7.6 4 5 
Diet Cola 518 2.1 3 5 
Regular Orange 1320 5.6 4 5 
Diet Orange 136 0.6 2 3 
Regular Lemonade 1851 8.1 2 4 
Diet Lemonade 671 2.8 1 2 
Regular Mixed Fruit 2539 10.3 5 9 
Diet Mixed Fruit 21 0.1 1 1 
Multipack Cans     
Regular Cola 630 2.5 2 6 
Diet Cola 206 0.8 2 5 
Regular Orange 165 0.7 3 5 
Regular Lemonade 117 0.5 1 2 
Diet Lemonade 67 0.3 1 2 
Regular Mixed Fruit 6 0.05 1 1 
     
 24305 100 100 178 
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Table 2: Modelling Firm Size in Carbonated Drinks with 40 (Flavour by 
Packaging by Diet) Segments 
(i) All variables are in logs; (ii) * significant at the 5 per cent level; (iii) t-statistics in parentheses; 
(iv) GLS (a) refers to a random effects model and GLS (b) refers to a random effects model corrected 
for AR1 
(v) Market Cycle and Relevant Market Cycle are net of the firm’s sales. 
 
(a) Segment coverage based on a count of segments that a firm covers  
Firm Size OLS  OLS I GLS I 
  (a) 
GLS I 
(b) 
OLS II GLS II 
(a) 
GLS II 
(b) 
Segment 
Coveraget0 
1.67 
(16.9)* 
1.5 
(11.3)*
2.14 
(4.7)* 
2.09 
(5.2)* 
0.86 
(6.5)* 
0.05 
(2.2)* 
0.12 
(2.8)* 
Market Cycle  -1.21 
(0.9) 
1.43 
(3.8)* 
0.92 
(3.1)* 
   
Relevant Market 
Cycle 
    1.20 
(18.2)* 
1.31 
(17.2)* 
1.22 
(10.9)*
Constant 2.09 
(7.8)* 
5.2 
(2.2)* 
-14.3 
(3.4)* 
-8.9 
(2.7)* 
-6.3 
(5.9)* 
-8.1 
(6.2)* 
-7.5 
(6.2)* 
No. Obs. 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R2 Overall  0.52 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.62 0.62 0.62 
R2 Within   0.06 0.06  0.54 0.54 
R2 Between   0.57 0.58  0.63 0.63 
Hausman Test: 
Random Effects 
  χ2(1)= 0   χ2(1)=0.03  
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
20 flavourXpackage 
     χ2(2)=133 
prob>χ2= 0 
 
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
4 flavour  
     χ2(2)= 1135 
prob>χ2= 0  
 
AR1 χ2(1)=221 χ2(1)=216 χ2(1)=119  χ2(1)=221 χ2(1)= 43  
Hetroskedasticity χ2(1)= 99 χ2(2)=99  χ2(2)= 10 χ2(2)= 10 χ2(2)=144 χ2(2)= 10  χ2(2)= 10 
 
(b) Segment coverage based on a count of segments that a firm covers, weighted by 
firms percentage coverage of stores in a segment 
Firm Size OLS  OLS I GLS I 
  (a) 
GLS I 
(b) 
OLS II GLS II 
(a) 
GLS II 
(b) 
Weight Segment 
Coverage t0 
1.02 
(26.5)* 
1.00 
(20.4)*
1.12 
(7.6)* 
1.09 
(8.7)* 
0.78 
(15.9)* 
0.68 
(4.5)* 
0.70 
(5.6)* 
Market Cycle  0.36 
(0.8) 
1.40 
(3.7)* 
0.89 
(3.0)* 
   
Relevant Market 
Cycle 
    0.77 
(7.4)* 
1.29 
(17.0)* 
1.19 
(10.8)*
Constant 5.72 
(61.1)* 
-9.45 
(2.0)* 
-8.9 
(2.3)* 
-3.7 
(1.2) 
-0.8 
(0.9) 
-7.5 
(7.2)* 
-4.6 
(4.7)* 
No. Obs. 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R2 Overall  0.73 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.76 
R2 Within   0.06 0.06  0.54 0.54 
R2 Between   0.81 0.81  0.80 0.81 
Hausman Test: 
Random Effects 
  χ2(1)=3.6   χ2(1)=2.7  
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
20 flavourXpackage 
     χ2(2)=114 
prob>χ2=0 
 
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
4 flavour  
     χ2(2)=8.7 
prob>χ2=.01 
 
AR1 χ2(1)=198 χ2(1)=196 χ2(1)=119  χ2(1)=198  χ2(1)= 43  
Hetroskedasticity χ2(2)= 51  χ2(2)= 51 χ2(2)= 5 χ2(2)= 8 χ2(2)= 56 χ2(2)= 16 χ2(2)= 16 
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(c) Segment coverage based on a count of vertical segments that a firm covers, 
weighted by firms effective coverage of stores (i.e. store share of carbonated soft 
drink sales) in a segment 
Firm Size OLS  OLS I GLS I 
  (a) 
GLS I 
(b) 
OLS II GLS II 
(a) 
GLS II 
(b) 
Weight Segment 
Coverage t0 
1.16 
(27.5)* 
1.16 
(21.3)*
1.29 
(8.4)* 
1.25 
(9.6)* 
0.88 
(18.1)* 
0.82 
(5.1)* 
0.88 
(5.8)* 
Market Cycle  0.004 
(0.01) 
1.42 
(3.8)* 
0.9 
(3.1)* 
   
Relevant Market 
Cycle 
    0.83 
(8.9)* 
1.29 
(17.1)* 
1.18 
(10.9)*
Constant 4.83 
(48.0)* 
-4.74 
(1.0) 
-10.1 
(2.6)* 
-4.75 
(1.6) 
-2.02 
(2.6)* 
-6.05 
(8.4)* 
-5.23 
(5.5)* 
No. Obs. 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R2 Overall  0.75 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.80 0.79 0.80 
R2 Within   0.06 0.06  0.54 0.54 
R2 Between   0.84 0.85  0.85 0.86 
Hausman Test: 
Random Effects 
  χ2(1)=3.0   χ2(1)=2.1  
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
20 flavourXpackage 
     χ2(2)=6 
prob>χ2=0.1 
 
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
4 flavour  
     χ2(2)=3546 
prob>χ2=0 
 
AR1 χ2(1)=196 χ2(1)=198 χ2(1)=109  χ2(1)=196  χ2(1)=38   
Hetroskedasticity χ2(1)= 45  χ2(2)= 48 χ2(2)= 5  χ2(2)=  5 χ2(2)= 45  χ2(2)= 18 χ2(2)= 16 
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Table 3: Modelling Brand Competition in Carbonated Drinks with 40 (Flavour 
by Packaging by Diet) Segments 
(i) All variables are in logs; (ii) * significant at the 5 per cent level; (iii) t-statistics in parentheses;                    
(iv) GLS (a) refers to a random effects model and GLS (b) refers to a random effects model, with own 
price instrumented using a size weighted average price of a firms’ brands in other segments, and 
segment size instrumented using real expenditure on all other segments. (v) initial weighted store 
coverage is the percentage of total carbonated sales that the stores covered by a brand account for; (vi) 
own price is paasch brand price; (vii) cross-price is a weighted (by store specialisation) average price 
of all other brands within a segment  
Brand Expenditure Share OLS  GLS (a) GLS (b) 
Instrument 
Own-Price & 
Segment 
Size 
GLS (b) 
Instrument 
& Correct 
for AR1 
Segment Size -0.39 
(4.1)* 
-0.43 
(8.6)* 
-0.82 
(3.8)* 
-0.35 
(3.3)* 
Weighted Store Coverage t0 0.96 
(37.0)* 
0.94 
(12.9)* 
0.90 
(3.2)* 
0.95 
(12.5)* 
Brand Own Price -0.53 
(2.3)* 
-0.57 
(3.8)* 
-9.8 
(3.6)* 
-1.4 
(2.0)* 
Cross-Price in Segment 0.28 
(13.1)* 
0.06 
(4.8)* 
0.08 
(4.2)* 
0.03 
(3.3)* 
Constant -4.9 
(6.1)* 
-4.2 
(3.0)* 
1.9 
(0.5) 
-2.2 
(1.8) 
No. Obs. 3159 3159 3111 3111 
R2 Overall  0.54 0.51 0.33 0.48 
R2 Within  0.21 0.06 0.20 
R2 Between  0.69 0.59 0.66 
Hausman Test: Random 
Effects 
 χ2(27)= 0 
prob>χ2=1 
  
Hausman Specification Test 
for less segmentation:     
Flavour by Packaging Only 
 χ2(71)=26
4prob>χ2= 
0 
  
Hausman Specification Test 
for less segmentation:     
Flavour Only 
 χ2(71)=42
9prob>χ2= 
0 
  
Hausman Specification Test 
for less segmentation:     
No Segments 
 χ2(71)=38
9prob>χ2= 
0 
  
Hausman Test: 
Instrumenting  
  χ2(68) = 20 
prob>χ2= 
1.0 
 
AR1 χ2(1)=262 χ2(1) = 
99 
χ2(1) = 95  
Hetroskedasticity χ2(71)=210 χ2(71)= 
64 
χ2(68)= 69  
Firm, Segment, and Month 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 1: Actua bution in the Irish Carbonated Soft Drinks 
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Figure 2: Firm Size Distribution Based on a Count of Roles over 40 Segments 
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Figure 3: Firm Size Distribution Based on a Count of Roles, Weighted by Firm 
y Coverage of Stores within a Segment, over 40 Segments (Flavour by Packaging b
Diet) 
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Figure 5: Actual Firm Size Distributions Within 40 (Flavour by Packaging by Di
Segments in Carbonated Soft Drinkss 
Firm Size Distributio
et) 
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i.  For a comprehensive review of this literature on firm size 
distributions, the reader is referred to Sutton [1997]. Gibrat [1931], 
using the mathematics of “stochastic processes”, postulates that the 
size-growth relationship for active firms generates size distributions 
approximately lognormal in form. Hart and Prais (1956) and Iijri 
and Simon (1964,1977) build in a stochastic entry process around 
Gibrats size growth relationship for active firms. Unfortunately, 
simple generalisations on the form of firm size distributions, as 
outcomes of a historical stochastic processes, do not describe firm 
size distributions observed across the general run of industries.  
Another strand of literature beginning with Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson (1988), using rich firm level data, suggest that the 
relationship between firm growth and firm characteristics, including 
size and age, is much more complex. Indeed theorists, such as 
Jovanovic (1982), tried to give the size-growth relationship an 
economic foundation and found the relationship to be sensitive to 
the details of modelling. In general, the vast volume of empirical 
studies testing growth, size and age relationships seem to agree that 
Gibrat’s law fails and points to the success of idiosyncratic firm and 
sector characteristics. It seems that no general predictions can be 
made from short run dynamics on the form of limiting size 
distributions. This paper clearly demonstrates the nature of the 
relationship between short run dynamics and long-run size 
distributions in the retail market of Carbonated Soft Drinks. 
ii Sutton (1998) marries the approach taken in Iijri and Simon 
(1964,1977) with the game theoretic approach used in Sutton (1991).  
In Sutton (1991), in the Bain [1951] tradition, stage games motivated 
differences in the lower bound to firm concentration that can be 
expected to exist across advertising and non-advertising branches of 
4-5 digit food and drink products. In Sutton (1998) motivates a lower 
bound to firm size distribution that is modelled as an outcome of a 
sequence of deterministic entry stage-games across 
segments/investment opportunities during market evolution. 
Deterministic entry games replace the stochastic entry processes of 
Iijri and Simon (1964,1977). 
iii Sutton (1998) in Part I of the book shows how the nature of tastes 
and technology within an industry puts a joint restriction on 
endogenous sunk cost outlays and the size and numbers of 
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segments that evolve in the history of the industry. In the context of 
vii The introduction of foreign competition into the chain store 
e Lorenz Curve for each niche must lie close to the diagonal [for 
n illustration, see Sutton 1998, Chapter 12] 
Carbonated Soft Drinks if consumers were fully mobile across 
segments and advertising was very effective the market would 
evolve to be dominated by one segment. Tastes structures and 
advertising outlays, amongst other factors, have driven the degree 
of segmentation by product attribute documented in Table 1.   
iv Transportation costs ensure that a firm has to have a production 
location in a state to serve the local market.  
v To have a presence in a segment, a company must have at least one 
brand in a defined flavour, packaging and diet segment. 
vi Retail sales data are fundamentally different to company accounts 
data for these firms, and have a number of advantages for our 
analysis. With company accounts data it may be hard to disentangle 
produce for export from that for national consumption. Company 
accounts data may consist of both intermediate and final goods. 
Finally, company accounts data can encompass a range of products 
that are not even closely related on the demand side of the market. 
market, which induced structural upheaval in the market, did not 
take place until the end of 1998. Both international and national 
companies distributed their brands throughout a retail structure that 
was very stable through the period analysed in this paper. 
viii The Symmetry Principle is based on the Harsanyi and Selten 
(1988) concept of symmetry and subgame consistency.  
ix The importance of controlling for the coverage of a firm, in terms 
of their distribution through a subset of stores, and the effective 
coverage of a firm, in terms of the size of stores within the product 
sales, is illustrated in Walsh and Whelan (1999b). Specialisation of 
distribution through a subset of stores can relax competition within 
a product market.  
x. Only under the special conditions of very weak competition and 
overlapping of niches can theory predict the shape that the size 
distribution within niches must take. In this special case game 
theoretic analysis predicts an extremely fragmented outcome so that 
th
a
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xi The entry games that took place in the history of the industry 
 The basic problem in estimating demand for differentiated 
on. The 
clearly determined the equilibrium configuration of product 
attributes and stores that we observe each firm holding at this stage 
of industry maturity. We take this as an important structural feature 
that disciplines firm size and localised brand competition over the 
short time span that we study the industry. Clearly such structural 
features are endogenous to the nature of industry evolution.  Sutton 
(1998) with case studies of industries and Klepper and Simons (2000) 
with long time series data document the factors that determined 
how industries have evolved to endpoint structures. 
xii
products is the dimensionality problem. A linear demand system for 
n brands has n2 price parameters to estimate. They apply the multi-
stage budgeting structure to a three-stage demand system. The 
objective is to estimate all three levels of demand and combine the 
estimates to calculate the overall own and cross price elasticities for 
each brand. The discrete choice literature, in a random coefficient 
model, shows one how to calculate the cross-price elasticities 
between all pairs reducing the dimensionality space into a product 
space, see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). Our objective in this 
paper is more modest. We just want a simple test of market 
segmentation using the final stage of multi-stage budgeting used by 
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994). The main focus of the paper is 
on the imperfect and varying effective coverage of vertical segments 
by firms as a key determination of the firm size distributi
main objective of this section of the paper is to show that the nature 
of localised competition between the brands within segments is 
consistent with the main focus of the paper.        
